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Abstract Marc Lange argues that proofs by mathematical induction are gen-
erally not explanatory because inductive explanation is irreparably circular.
He supports this circularity claim by presenting two putative inductive ex-
planantia that are one another’s explananda. On pain of circularity, at most
one of this pair may be a true explanation. But because there are no relevant
differences between the two explanantia on offer, neither has the explanatory
high ground. Thus, neither is an explanation. I argue that there is no impor-
tant asymmetry between the two cases because they are two presentations of
the same explanation. The circularity argument requires a problematic notion
of identity of proofs. I argue for a criterion of proof individuation that identifies
the two proofs Lange offers. This criterion can be expressed in two equivalent
ways: one uses the language of homotopy type theory, and the second assigns
algebraic representatives to proofs. Though I will concentrate on one example,
a criterion of proof identity has much broader consequences: any investiga-
tion into mathematical practice must make use of some proof-individuation
principle.
Keywords mathematical explanation, proof theory, homotopy type theory,
mathematical induction
1 Introduction
Lange (2009) argues that proofs by mathematical induction are generally not
explanatory on the grounds that inductive explanation is irreparably circular.
He supports this circularity claim by presenting two putative inductive ex-
planantia that are one another’s explananda. On pain of circularity, at most
one of this pair may be a true explanation. But because there are no relevant
differences between the two explanantia on offer, neither has the explanatory
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high ground. Thus, neither is an explanation. Since any inductive explana-
tory attempt has this kind of evil twin, no inductive proof is explanatory. The
claimed virtue of Lange’s argument is that it avoids “making any controver-
sial presuppositions about what mathematical explanations would be” (2009,
203), unlike most other approaches to this question, which rely on intuitions
about particular cases and the nature of the natural numbers.
One kind of defense of induction’s explanatory value tries to break the sym-
metry between the two cases (Baker 2010). Perhaps one of the explanations
will be longer, or perhaps one will be more complex, disjunctive, unnatural,
or whatever. And perhaps one of these differences is relevant when it comes
to explanatory power. I do not think that this approach can work here, be-
cause there are no differences in explanatory power. Lange’s argument fails for
a different reason. There is no important asymmetry between the two cases
because they are two presentations of the same explanation. That is, Lange’s
argument requires the supposition that the two explanations on offer are dif-
ferent. This supposition is controversial, though the controversy has not, to
my knowledge, been raised in the literature on mathematical explanation. In
what follows, I aim to drum up this controversy by arguing for a criterion
of proof identity that identifies the two proofs Lange offers. Though I will
concentrate on one example, a criterion of proof identity has much broader
consequences: any investigation into mathematical practice must make use of
some proof-individuation principle.
2 The need for a theory of proof identity
When presented with the question of what makes a proof explanatory, there is
a natural strategy to pursue. Suppose that an explanatory proof is a proof that
has some X factor. Collect a stack of proofs. From these, select the ones that
are intuitively explanatory. If we are lucky, there will be some characteristic
shared by all and only the explanatory proofs. We can then take this to be the
X factor. Sadly, we are spectacularly unlucky. Intuitions on the explanatory
power of particular proofs diverge wildly. On the one hand, inductive proofs
are sometimes taken “to be paradigms of non-explanatory proofs” (Hafner and
Mancosu 2005, 237). On the other, it is sometimes said that induction “more
than any other feature, best characterizes the natural numbers,” and that this
is why, compared to other approaches, proof by induction “is in many ways
better—it is more explanatory” (Brown 1997, 177). This battle of intuitions
has reached a standoff.
The great strength of Lange’s argument is that it sidesteps this problem
entirely. Leave explanatory virtue unanalyzed. Whatever else an explanatory
proof is, it is an explanation, and so it must partake of the same properties as
other explanations. In particular, it cannot be circular—no mathematical fact
can explain itself. But suppose, says Lange, that some proof by mathematical
induction were explanatory. Then it would explain for some predicate P why
it is that for all n ∈ N, P (n). And it would do so by the following method:
What inductive explanations could not be 3
N induction: to prove that P (n) for all n ∈ N, prove:
– P (0)
– for all n ∈ N: if P (n), then P (n + 1)
But there is another proof method nearby, which would also establish that
P (n) for all n ∈ N:
N 5-induction: to prove that P (n) for all n ∈ N, prove:
– P (5)
– for all n ≥ 5, if P (n) then P (n + 1)
– for all 0 ≤ n < 5, if P (n + 1) then P (n)
While induction on the naturals starts at 0 and goes up, 5-induction starts
at 5, then goes both up and down. They are apparently different methods
of proof, but none of the differences are explanatorily-relevant, so they are
equally explanatory. But they cannot both be explanatory, because this leads
to circularity. To see why, note that through standard induction, P (0) helps
to explain why P (5) holds. Through 5-induction, P (5) helps to explain why
P (0) holds. Thus, by transitivity of explanation, P (0) helps to explain why
P (0) holds, an absurdity.
This circularity argument assumes that induction and 5-induction are dif-
ferent proof methods. That is, it tacitly relies on some principle of individua-
tion of mathematical proofs. And perhaps taking these proofs to be different
has some initial plausibility. But this first thought weakens under scrutiny.
First, syntactic differences don’t suffice to distinguish proofs. Simply rear-
ranging the order of the premises doesn’t produce a new proof. Nor, for that
matter, does changing the order of subproofs, as long as they are logically in-
dependent. Just imagine submitting such a reshuﬄed proof to a mathematics
journal as a piece of novel scholarship! These syntactic features are aspects of
the presentation, not the proof. Presenting a proof in written form requires
writing it down in a certain order, but ordinal facts about this presentation
are properties of the proof itself just to the extent that they track inferential
relationships.
This is not to say that syntax is the only difference between induction and
5-induction. It is just to say that if there is an important difference between
the two proof methods, it must be a difference in inferential structure, not in
presentation. Furthermore, it seems that not just any difference in inferential
structure will do. Suppose that we have some proof that P from some set of
premises. Our premises stand in some inferential relationship with our con-
clusion, and these relationships are most likely mediated by other inferential
relationships between intermediate conclusions. We can modify this inferential
network by appending “if P , then P ; therefore P” to the end of our proof,
introducing one more inferential relationship. This results in a valid proof,
and the inferential network is different in some sense, but this modification
does not give us a new proof, and certainly not in a sense that’s relevant to
explanation. And this is just one of many ways that a proof might be triv-
ially “modified” without actually producing a new proof—a similarly empty
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instance of modus ponens might be introduced, or a tautology inserted, at any
step along the way.
It seems to me that the differences between some proof by induction and
its 5-inductive partner are differences of this kind. In both cases we show that
P holds of some small number or numbers, and then we show that P also
holds for an arbitrarily large number because it holds for its predecessor. The
difference between a proof by induction and a proof by 5-induction is a matter
of where we turn our attention when describing the inferential structure of
the proof, not a matter of the inferential structure itself. But as noted above,
intuitions on these questions diverge wildly, and someone moved by Lange’s
argument is not likely to share this one. So this appeal to intuition needs to be
backed up with more general theoretical considerations. The next two sections
are two ways of spelling out a more systematic story about identity of proofs
that agrees with the intuition that induction and 5-induction coincide.
The intuitive picture behind this story proceeds from the observation above
that some rearrangements of a proof’s presentation are clearly changes in
presentation alone, not in the proof itself. Changing the order of the premises,
or changing the names of variables, or translating the proof into French does
not change the mathematical content. In these cases it’s easy to see that such
manipulations change nothing about the mathematics, because they make no
reference to the mathematical facts involved or the relationships between them.
So too, I claim, for the manipulations that turn a proof by induction into a
proof by 5-induction, and vice versa. A proof by induction can be turned into
a proof by 5-induction via a recipe expressed just in terms of the two proof
steps of induction and the three proof steps of 5-induction. This translation
can be effected regardless of the conclusion of the proofs or the internal details
of the proof steps. And it really is a translation, not a mere correspondence:
the justifications of P (5) in each proof, for example, or the proof that P (n)→
P (n+ 1) for arbitrarily high n, are the same before and after the translation.
This systematicity suggests that the underlying inferential networks are the
same, and that an appropriate principle of individuation would—by virtue of
correctly capturing the inferential network—make the translation plain.
For a very simple example, consider the statement that every natural num-
ber has a number less than or equal to it. We could prove this by induction
in two intuitively different ways. We could, for example, prove it by noting
that 0 is equal to itself, and n+ 1 is greater than 0 for all n. Alternatively, we
could prove it by noting that 0 is equal to itself, and n + 1 is greater than n
for all n. Either way, the translation into a proof by 5-induction is the same:
the fact that 0 is equal to itself appears in both translations, and the witness
to P (5)—which is 0 in the first proof and 4 in the second—appears in the cor-
responding proof by 5-induction as the justification for P (5), as well. Clearly
it doesn’t matter to our translation what the specific justification for P (5)
is in a proof by induction; we just take the justification for P (5), whatever
it may be, and present it as the justification in the base case of our proof.
So, intuitively, such a translation turns one description of the justifications
for P (n) and their arrangement into another description of the same array
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of justifications. We have some reassurance that this translation hasn’t for-
gotten anything about the inferential structure of the proof: it produces two
intuitively different proofs by 5-induction from two intuitively different proofs
by induction. And indeed, we can translate any proof by 5-induction back the
other direction, preserving intuitive differences in the same way.
We might make this intuitive story precise in two ways. Either way, the
strategy will be to find some mathematical representation of the network of
inferential relationships that connects the premises, intermediate conclusions,
and conclusion. This allows us to individuate proofs by individuating their
mathematical representatives, which is a much more familiar task. On the
first approach, induction principles and the proofs they produce are treated
syntactically. This is the point of view found in the theory behind automated
proof software, which may be used to check and construct mathematical proofs.
In this theory, induction principles like induction, 5-induction, and more are
associated with particular types of objects, and proofs about these objects
just are proofs that involve the corresponding induction principle. That is, an
object of an inductive type is picked out by its place in a network of infer-
ences that is described by the corresponding induction principle. The theory
of these types can provide us with a criterion of identity of types, and we can
distinguish or identify induction principles on the basis of their correspond-
ing types. Alternatively, we might try to describe this network more directly.
Given an induction principle, we can construct an algebraic object that char-
acterizes the schematic shape of the inferential relationships that the principle
describes. For example, any proof by induction must involve some proof that
the property of interest holds for 0, as well as a proof that the property holds
for n+1 when it holds for n, and these must be appropriately related. Once we
have an algebraic characterization, we can then distinguish proofs by induction
by distinguishing their corresponding algebras.
3 The syntactic approach
For the syntactic approach I will adopt a version of homotopy type theory
(UFP, 2013), including at least higher inductive types and univalence. Ho-
motopy type theory is a recent interpretation of Martin-Lo¨f type theory into
abstract homotopy theory. As a type theory, it allows us to implement the
broad-strokes syntactic picture of proof identity in the previous paragraph.
Indeed, this is the same broad-strokes picture Kreisel (1971, p. 111) draws
on the basis of Martin–Lo¨f’s work. As a type theory, homotopy type theory
is proof relevant. Any mathematical statement has a corresponding type in
the theory, and a proof of this statement is a term of that type. The same
statement may have more than one proof, and as a result there may be more
than one term of the corresponding type. For example, consider the claim “for
all n ∈ N, there exists some m ∈ N such that m ≤ n”. Giving a proof of this
means deriving a term of type ∀n.P (n), where P is a predicate corresponding
to the existential claim. By induction, it suffices to give a term of type P (0)
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and one of type ∀n.(P (n)→ P (n+ 1)). Two terms will differ just in case they
involve different terms of type P (0) or different terms for the induction step.
For example, we might produce 0 for all n in the induction step, or we might
produce n+ 1. Because these are different terms, they produce different terms
of type ∀n.P (n) after applying induction. So if we adopt term identity as a
criterion of proof identity, then these proofs are different, in accord with the
above plausibility argument. Furthermore, trivial modifications like append-
ing “if ∀n.P (n), then ∀n.P (n); therefore ∀n.P (n)” will not change the term
produced, so this appendix does not give a new proof. Inserting tautological
detours along the way will also have no effect.
Proof relevance of this kind allows homotopy type theory to avoid some
worries faced by the naive criterion. But it does not completely address the
problem of different syntactic presentations of the same proof. For example,
there is no way to compare a proof that starts with the base case to a proof
that starts with the induction step, even though this ordering doesn’t re-
flect anything about the inferential structure of the proof. This is where the
homotopical side of homotopy type theory steps in. The univalence axiom,
introduced by Voevodsky, gives a way to prove that two types are equal, and
thus a way to compare their terms (UFP, 2013, §2.10). Without adding the
univalence axiom to Martin-Lo¨f type theory, there is in general no way to
prove that two types are equal. So if we are going to say that two types give
different syntactic presentations of the same mathematical statement, we need
univalence.
Roughly, univalence says that to prove that two inductive types are equal,
we must show that their induction principles describe the same inferential
structure. It must be possible to give a canonical, systematic translation rule
between proofs using one induction principle and proofs using the other. This
rule must be canonical in the sense that there must be only one possible
translation, given the rule. That is, the translator must not be required to
make any arbitrary choices. The systematicity requirement means that the
translation must be independent of the proofs given as input, for example
the base case and induction step. Moreover, it must really be a translation,
not just a correlation, in that it must also correlate proper parts of proofs it
relates, in a way compatible with the correlations between proofs themselves.
Induction principles are meant to describe a network of inferential relations in
which the various subproofs stand, and these relations are independent of the
internal structure of the subproofs. A systematic translation between proofs
by induction and shuﬄed proofs by induction is easy: we just provide the two
subproofs in a different order. So the two types are equal, as we would expect.
This syntactic criterion judges induction and 5-induction to be the same in-
duction principle. This follows straightforwardly from the definition of the nat-
ural numbers (UFP, 2013, §1.9), any adequate characterization of 5-induction
as a higher inductive type (UFP, 2013, Ch. 6), and univalence.1 To show that
1 5-induction must be given by a higher inductive type because it has 5 = S5(0) as a
generator, as well as equalities that quotient out the higher path structure.
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these induction principles produce the same proofs, it suffices to show that they
correspond to equal inductive types. To show this, we must give a canonical,
systematic translation from one induction principle to the other. So suppose
that we have a proof by induction. To give a proof of P (5), we can apply the
induction step five times to our proof of P (0). To give a proof of P (n) for all
n ≥ 5, note that this is just the induction step with a restricted domain of
quantification. Finally, for each 0 ≤ n < 5, we can apply the induction step n
times to P (0) to prove P (n), from which follows the conditional “if P (n+ 1),
then P (n)”. Feeding these three pieces into the 5-induction principle, we have
produced a proof of ∀n.P (n). We can tell a similar story if we start with a proof
by 5-induction; using P (5) and the downward induction step gives a proof of
P (0), and taking all three subproofs together gives the standard induction
step. Most importantly, this translation goes two ways: if I start with a proof
by induction, translate it to a proof by 5-induction, and then translate it back,
I end up with the same proof I started with, and vice versa. So if I start with
distinct proofs by induction I will produce distinct proofs by 5-induction. If we
take these induction rules to describe a particular inferential structure, then
this translation rule shows that they give superficially different descriptions of
the exact same inferential structure. That is, nothing is lost in translation.
So, to return to the motivating case, this syntactic principle of proof indi-
viduation avoids the problems of the naive account, and it adequately char-
acterizes the inferential structure of a proof by induction. Because it judges
induction and 5-induction to describe the same network of inferences, there
is no circularity nearby. One could, of course, use induction to conclude that
∀n.P (n), and then argue, again by induction, that this implies ∀n.P (n). But
this is not some pathological feature of induction, because this can be done
with any explanation of a universal generalization. If induction has some en-
demic explanatory defect, it must be found in whatever X factor it is that
endows proofs with explanatory power. And this is just the very difficult ques-
tion that Lange’s argument aimed to avoid. So if we adopt this syntactic
principle, then Lange’s argument is blocked.
4 The semantic approach
Alternatively, we might try to characterize the inferential network of an in-
ductive proof more directly, with more familiar mathematical objects. The
main difficulty here is turning an inductive principle, which is like a recipe,
into a mathematical object, which seems much more like a freestanding thing.
A principle of induction tells you how to do something; it is instructions for
some sort of behavior that will result in a proof. A mathematical object, on
the other hand, is inert. It does not tell you how to make things. If we are to
encode an inductive principle as a mathematical object, we must have some
way of recovering the principle from that object. So we need some way to turn
an inert mathematical object into a recipe for doing.
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The key feature that allows this is the fact that induction acts “freely”.
That is, it takes some number of subproofs and extends them to a larger
domain in the only possible natural way. So an inductive principle is a recipe,
but it is like a recipe for a stew. A stew recipe is a list of some vegetables,
some meat, and some liquid. If I give you such a list, there’s really only one
natural thing you can do with the listed ingredients: put them in a pot and
heat them. Indeed, stews can be characterized by this fact. That is, a stew just
is whatever food you end up with after heating vegetables, meat, and liquid
in a pot.
Slightly less fancifully, we might try to characterize an induction principle
by giving some minimal algebraic structure that will support the principle’s
application. Natural-numbers induction can be applied in many contexts. For a
concrete example, suppose we would like to show that a binary tree of height h
has at most 2h+1−1 nodes. A natural strategy is to run an inductive argument
on the height h of the tree. If we show that this fact is true for a tree of height
0, and that it is true for height h + 1 whenever it is true for height h, then
by induction it is true for any height h. We can similarly induct on lengths
of lists, number of lines in a natural deduction, and so on. We could even
run induction on subsets of the natural numbers. The minimal structure that
will support induction is a triple (X,x0, s) of a set X, a distinguished element
x0 ∈ X, and a function s : X → X. Whenever we have a triple like this, we
can apply induction. We can do this when X is the natural numbers, x0 is
0, and s is the successor function, and we can do this when X is the set of
equivalence classes of binary trees by height, x0 is the set of trees of height
zero, and s increments the height by 1.
Define an N-algebra to be some triple like this. Any time that we have
this structure, we can apply induction. Similarly, any time we have a list of
vegetables and meat, we can make a stew. What we would like to do is go
the other way. That is, we would like some N-algebra such that any proof
about it will be a proof by induction. This algebra would then be the per-
fect stand-in for the structure of proof by induction: it would represent all
and only the structure required for the proof technique. If we had such a rep-
resentative (X,x0, s), then any proof by induction must have an inferential
structure comparable to a proof about (X,x0, s). There must be some domain
of quantification corresponding to X, and there must be some base case cor-
responding to x0, and there must be some “successor” function corresponding
to s. Moreover, this correspondence must preserve the inferential structure of
the proof. We should be able to label elements of our domain of quantifica-
tion with elements of X, and the successor function should take the element
labeled by x to the element labeled by s(x). This would give a homomorphism
of inferential structures, which is what we seek to capture. And if we have a
similar algebraic stand-in for some other proof method, we can turn the ques-
tion of comparing the inferential structure of the proofs into the question of
comparing the algebraic structure of the algebras.
So a representative of an induction principle, if it exists, is a universal “la-
beling algebra” for structures to which that induction principle applies. But
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what makes an induction principle an induction principle, and not some other
method of proof, is the fact that it acts “freely”. This is why a proof by in-
duction is more like a recipe for stew than for something fussy like, say, a
macaron. Mathematically, this freedom is witnessed by the existence of this
sort of universal labeling algebra.2 So we may assign to each induction principle
a particular algebraic object: its “universal labeler”. For example, induction
over the natural numbers is assigned the triple (N, 0, S), where S is the suc-
cessor function. You might think of this triple as equipping the target domain
of the proof, N, with an algebraic structure (0, S) representing the structure of
proofs by induction. Other kinds of proofs about the naturals amount to other
kinds of structures that can be put on the set of natural numbers. Likewise,
some other N-algebra (X,x0, s) can be thought of as equipping the set X with
an algebraic structure (x0, s) representing proofs by induction.
We’ve reduced the problem of distinguishing between proofs to a problem
of distinguishing between the associated universal labelers. Again, we must be
cautious. We ought to distinguish between labelers only insofar as they dis-
agree about the inferential structure of the induction principles they represent.
For example, one might take N to be the set of Zermelo ordinals, where 0 is
represented by ∅, and the successor function sends some set n to {n}. Or one
might take N to be the set of von Neumann ordinals, where 0 is represented
by ∅ and the successor function sends n to n∪{n}. These choices give isomor-
phic N-algebras, meaning that they are identical with respect to their labeling
ability. In other words, there is a unique way to label von Neumann ordi-
nals with Zermelo ordinals in a way that respects the successor function, and
likewise for the other direction. So two induction principles with isomorphic
representatives differ merely in relabeling, not in inferential structure.
But isomorphism is still too strict a criterion. For suppose that we pre-
ferred to prove the induction step first. Then our universal labeler would be
of the form (X, s, x0), with s : X → X the successor function and x0 the
distinguished element. And this triple could never be isomorphic to (N, 0, S),
because they are algebras of different signature. The second entry in (X, s, x0)
is a function on the first entry, and the second entry of (N, 0, S) is an ele-
ment of the first entry. So isomorphism simply can’t be defined between these
two objects. Nevertheless, they must represent the same induction principle,
if syntactic reshuﬄing really makes no difference.
To solve this, we may again appeal to the existence of a canonical, system-
atic correspondence between substructures that generates a translation. Given
an N-algebra, we can produce an algebra for the shuﬄed induction principle by
using the same set but taking the third entry for the second and the second for
the third. This same translation principle will also allow us to turn a shuﬄed
induction algebra into an N-algebra. And no choices ever need be made in this
translation, so when following this rule we never add or subtract any informa-
tion. Moreover, when this sort of translation exists, it always sends universal
2 More prosaically, every induction principle has an associated (homotopy) initial object
in the category of algebras associated with that induction principle. See Sojakova (2015) for
a precise statement and proof of this fact.
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labelers to universal labelers, so (N, 0, S) is matched up with (N, S, 0). If we can
reconstruct an network of inferences from the triple (N, 0, S)—and we can—
then we can reconstruct the same network from (N, S, 0) by first translating
it by our rule to (N, 0, S). So we should not distinguish between induction
principles that differ only up to this kind of translation.3
This individuation principle also judges induction and 5-induction to be
the same principle. Induction may be represented by the triple (N, 0, S) of a
set, a distinguished zero element, and a successor function. 5-induction appears
to be more complicated, as it is represented by a quadruple (N′, 0, 5, S) of a
set N, two distinguished elements 0 and 5, and a successor function S such
that 5 is equal to S5(0). These could not be isomorphic, since they are tuples
of different length, but as algebras they describe the same structure. Given
a triple (N, 0, S) we can produce a quadruple (N, 0, S5(0), S), and given a
quadruple we can produce a triple by forgetting about the second distinguished
element. That is, the only difference between induction and 5-induction is that
5-induction gives a special name to the element S5(0). But we should not care
about the names we give to places in the network of inferences, because these
are facts about the representation, not the structure of the proof itself. It is
really no different from reordering S and 0.
So we have a second principle of proof individuation that also avoids the
problems of the naive account, and also adequately characterizes the inferential
structure of proof by induction. And it comes to the same verdict as the first
principle: induction and 5-induction describe the same network of inferences
from different points of view. The circularity argument is undercut because
there is no circle after all. So again, if induction systematically fails to provide
explanations, then this is a fact about the extra explanatory factor, not the
structure of inductive proofs.
5 Conclusion
Two principles of proof individuation may seem an embarrassment of riches.
The success of Lange’s argument turns on which principle we adopt, so we
must pick the correct one. I have offered two serious options in addition to our
naive point of departure, so we now seem to be faced with the task of sorting
out the right individuation principle from all the available options. This is a
valuable task, and its consequences are far broader than the present question of
induction’s explanatory power. Mathematicians assess proofs with respect to
many other values, as well—beauty, purity, depth, and more. Insofar as these
are virtues of proofs and not presentations, an account of any one of these
must only appeal to properties that are invariant under the right notion of
proof identity. Or, contrapositively, any aspect of a proof that appears only in
some of its presentations cannot be relevant to its explanatory power, beauty,
3 To put this all more precisely, we should not distinguish between induction principles if
their associated categories of algebras are equivalent. Equivalence preserves initiality, so a
“universal labeler” for one principle is equivalently a “universal labeler” for the other.
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depth, and so on. So a criterion of proof individuation is a valuable tool in
the development of these accounts, offering at least some constraint on the
wildly divergent intuitions about explanatory power. By the same token, a
criterion of proof individuation helps our intuitions about these other features
to regiment our intuitions about explanatory power. When we evaluate criteria
like the two I have presented, we can appeal to many more considerations than
explanation. This gives us many reasons on which to make our choice—and
my opponent a wider set of cases to wield against my criteria.
But even without looking to these other considerations, you might worry
that neither of my criteria gets things right, since they conflict with intuitions
about proof identity itself. You might worry that these criteria identify proofs
that they should not. For example, most any proof of a statement beginning
“for all natural numbers n. . . ” is identical to some proof by induction or
other, by these criteria—this is part of why induction and 5-induction deliver
identical proofs of statements about the naturals. This seems counterintuitive,
for it seems that there are some proofs about the natural numbers that are
not proofs by induction. And if this worry is right, then what I’ve said above
isn’t very reassuring when it comes to the circularity worry. Since my solution
relies on identifying the two proofs that generated the circularity, any reason
to think that my criteria are too weak is also a reason to worry that the right
criteria won’t defuse the circularity.
To some extent this is just the clash of intuitions about induction with
which we began. On the one hand are the intuitions that induction is paradig-
matically non-explanatory; on the other, the thought that induction best char-
acterizes the naturals and gives the most explanatory proofs. According to my
criteria proofs about the naturals are always inductive, so they give the only
proofs. This seems right to me. Proofs about the naturals generally involve
induction because they are about the natural numbers, what it is to be a nat-
ural number is to be zero or a successor of a natural number. It’s not just
that induction best characterizes the naturals, it defines them. So if you’d like
to prove something about the naturals, you’ll have to say what you’re talking
about, and this means referring to induction. The approaches I’ve sketched
above are ways of spelling out the thought that induction best characterizes
the natural numbers.
Because this is just where we began, I don’t expect that these considera-
tions will do much to assuage worries about this verdict. My purpose in offering
the criteria above is, in part, to draw a connection between this debate and any
other where it matters when two proofs are the same or different. With luck,
we will find further resources to adjudicate the present dispute. But this will
only succeed if we use the right criterion from above. However, we need not
choose; they come down to the same thing. As shown by Awodey et al. (2012)
and Sojakova (2015), the inductive types of the syntactic approach may be
equivalently characterized by the universal labeling algebras of the semantic
approach. So the approaches agree on how to individuate inferential networks
produced by inductive principles—we need not choose between them. We have
one good criterion of proof individuation, and with it in hand there is no threat
12 John Dougherty
of circularity in inductive proofs. What’s more, this criterion gives a univo-
cal and well-defined tool we can bring to bear on questions of beauty, purity,
depth, and other virtues of proofs.
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